On the Distortion Value of the Elections with Abstention by Ghodsi, Mohammad et al.
On the Distortion Value of the Elections with Abstention
Mohammad Ghodsi ∗† Mohamad Latifian ∗ Masoud Seddighin ∗
December 27, 2018
Abstract
In Spatial Voting Theory, distortion is a measure of how good the winner is. It is proved that
no deterministic voting mechanism can guarantee a distortion better than 3, even for simple
metrics such as a line. In this study, we wish to answer the following question: how does the
distortion value change if we allow less motivated agents to abstain from the election?
We consider an election with two candidates and suggest an abstention model, which is
a more general form of the abstention model proposed by Kirchga¨ssner [15]. We define the
concepts of the expected winner and the expected distortion to evaluate the distortion of an
election in our model. Our results fully characterize the distortion value and provide a rather
complete picture of the model.
1 Introduction
The goal in Social Choice Theory is to design mechanisms that aggregate agents’ preferences into a
collective decision. Voting is a well-studied method for aggregating preferences which has numerous
applications in multi-agent systems. Roughly, a voting mechanism takes the preferences of the
agents over a set of alternatives as input and selects one of the alternatives as the winner.
One approach to estimate the quality of a voting mechanism is to use the utilitarian view which
assumes that each agent has cost over the alternatives. For example, spatial models, locate the
voters and the alternatives in a finite metric space M, and the cost of alternative X for voter
vi is equal to their distance. Considering these costs, the optimal candidate is defined to be the
candidate that minimizes the social cost. Ideally, we would like the optimal candidate to be the
winner; however, since voting mechanisms only take the ordinal preferences of voters, it is reasonable
to expect that the winner is not always optimal. The question then arises: how good is the winner,
i.e., what is the worst-case ratio of the social cost of the winner to the social cost of the optimal
candidate? This ratio is called the distortion value of a voting mechanism. It is known that no
deterministic voting mechanism can guarantee a distortion better than 3, even for simple metrics
such as a line. To see this, consider the example shown in Figure 1. In this example, candidate L
is the optimal candidate, and under the plurality voting rule candidate R is the winner. Thus, the
distortion value is
0.51(0.5− ε) + 0.49 · 1
0.51(0.5 + ε)
' 3.
The example of Figure 1 shows the lower-bound of 3 on the distortion value. However, it seems
unrealistic in some ways. Although the voters located near the point 0.5 are closer to R, they
have a very low incentive to vote for R, since their costs for both candidates are almost equal. On
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Figure 1: An example with distortion value 3.
the other hand, agents located at 0 have a strong motivation to vote for L. In fact, if voters are
allowed to abstain (which is a natural assumption in many real-world elections, especially in large
elections), we expect L to be the winner rather than R.
In this study, our goal is to tackle this problem: how does the distortion value change if we
allow less motivated agents to abstain from voting?
1.1 Abstention
Scientists have long studied the factors affecting participation in an election. In particular, Wolfin-
ger and Rosenstone [11] argue that better educated and more informed voters participate with a
higher probability, or Lijphart [16] discusses that the voters on the left side of the political spectrum
participate less frequently than the ones on the right. Similarly, the decision to vote may rely on
variables such as income level or the sense of civic duty [24].
Traditionally, both game theoretic and decision theoretic models of turnout have been proposed.
In the heart of most of these models lies the assumption that there are costs for voting 1. These
costs include the costs of collecting and processing information, waiting in the queue and voting
itself. Presumably, if a voter decides to abstain, she does not have to pay these costs. Thus, a
rational voter must receive utility from voting. There is evidence suggesting that voters behave
strategically when deciding to vote and take the costs and benefits into account. For example, Blais
[3] finds that the closeness of elections influences the turnout; or Riker and Ordeshook [22] show
that the turnout is inversely related to voting costs.
Apart from social-psychological traits, spatial models of voting suggest that voters’ abstention
may stem from their ideological distances from the candidates. The work of Downs [8] initiated
this line of research. He argues that in a two-candidate election under the majority rule, the choice
between voting and abstaining is related to the voter’s comparative evaluation of the candidates.
Riker and Ordeshook [22] improve this model by reformulating the original equation to incorporate
other social and psychological factors.
Many empirical studies in the spatial theory of abstention frequently suggest that citizens are
more likely to abstain when they feel indifferent toward the candidates or alienated from them.
However, the models introduced by Downs [8] and Riker and Ordeshook [22] are only capable of
representing the indifference-based abstention which occurs when the difference between the costs
of candidates for a voter is too small to justify voting costs. On the other hand, these models cannot
justify alienation-based abstention, which occurs when a voter is too distant from the alternatives
to justify voting costs. To alleviate this, some studies argue that the relative distance plays a more
critical role than the absolute distance [15, 12].
1.2 Our Work
In this paper, we wish to study the effect of abstention on the distortion value. To represent
abstention, we consider a simple spatial model, which is a more general form of the model suggested
1There are other decision theoretic explanations of abstention that do not rely on costs, e.g., see [13].
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by Kirchga¨ssner [15]. In this model, there are two candidates, and the voters decide whether to vote
or abstain based on a comparison between the cost (i.e., distance) of their preferred alternative and
the cost of the other alternative. We define the concepts of expected winner and expected distortion
to evaluate the distortion of an election in our model. Our results fully characterize the distortion
value and provide a complete picture of the model. For the special case that our model conforms
exactly to that of [15], we show that the distortion of the expected winner is upper bounded by
1.522. We also give an almost tight upper bound on the expected distortion value of big elections.
Finally, we generalize our results to include arbitrary metric spaces. We show that the same
upper bounds we obtained on the distortion value for the line metric also work for arbitrary metric
space.
1.3 Related Work
The utilitarian view, which assumes all of the voters have costs for each alternative, is a well-
studied approach in welfare economics [23, 19]. This viewpoint has received attention from the
AI community during the past decade [20, 4]. Procaccia and Rosenschein [20] first introduced
distortion as a benchmark for measuring the efficiency of a social choice rule in utilitarian settings.
The worst-case distortion of many social choice functions is shown to be high. However, imposing
some mild constraints on the cost functions yields strong positive results. One of these assumptions,
which is reasonable in many political and social settings, is the spatial assumption, which assumes
that the agent costs form a metric space. [9, 17].
Anshelevich, Bhardwaj and Postl [1] were first to analyze the distortion of ordinal social choice
functions when evaluated for metric preferences. For plurality, Borda, and k-approval rules, they
prove that the worst case distortion is unbounded. On the positive side, they show that for the
Copeland rule, the distortion value is at most 5. They also prove the lower bound of 3 for any
deterministic mechanism. They conjecture that the worst-case distortion of Ranked Pairs social
choice rule meets this lower-bound, which is later refuted by Goel, Krishnaswamy, Anilesh, and
Munagala [14].
Anshelevich and Postl [2] consider randomized social choice rules. The output of such rules
is a probability distribution over the set of alternatives rather than a single winning alternative.
They show that for α-decisive metric spaces 2 any randomized rule has a lower-bound of 1 + α on
the distortion value. For the case of two alternatives, they propose an optimal algorithm with the
expected distortion of at most 1 + α. Cheng et al. [6] characterized the positional voting rules
with constant expected distortion value (independent of the number of candidates and the metric
space). Cheng et al. [5] consider the setting that the candidates are drawn independently from the
population of voters and prove the tight bound of 1.1716 for the distortion value in a line metric
and an upper-bound of 2 for an arbitrary metric space.
In addition to the studies mentioned in Section 1.1, many other studies consider the effects
of abstention in various types of elections. In a seminal paper, Moulin [18] shows that every
Condorcet consistent method is susceptible to the no-show paradox. Desmedt and Elkind in [7]
propose a game theoretic analysis of the plurality voting with the possibility of abstention and
characterize the preference profiles that admit a pure Nash equilibrium. Rabinovich et al. [21]
consider the computational aspects of iterative plurality voting with abstention.
2 A metric space is α-decisive, if for every voter, the cost of her preferred choice is at most α times the cost of her
second best choice.
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2 Preliminaries
Every election E consists of two ingredients: a set V of n voters and a set C of two candidates.
We denote the i’th voter by vi, and the candidates by L and R. Furthermore, we suppose that
the candidates and the voters are embedded in a finite metric space M. Unless explicitly stated
otherwise, we suppose that M is a line, and L and R are located at points 0 and 1, respectively.
For each voter vi, we refer to her location by xi. Moreover, we denote by di,X, the distance between
voter vi and candidate X ∈ {L,R}.
Definition 2.1. For every candidate X ∈ {L,R}, we define the average social cost of X as
cost(X) =
∑
i di,X
n
.
The optimal candidate is the candidate that minimizes the average social cost.
We consider a simple scenario where the winner is elected via the majority rule (in case of a tie,
the winner is determined by tossing a fair coin). Furthermore, we suppose that each voter either
abstains or votes for one of the candidates. In Section 2.1 we give a formal description of the voting
behavior of the agents.
2.1 Voting Behavior of individuals
As mentioned, we employ a simple probabilistic model, where each voter independently decides
whether to abstain or participate by evaluating her distances from the candidates. Fix a voter vi
and let X be the candidate who is closer to vi in M and X¯ be the other candidate. We suppose
that vi votes sincerely for her preferred candidate X with a probability pi, where pi is a function of
di,X and di,X¯, and abstains with probability 1− pi.
Denote by f the probability function that pi is derived from, i.e., pi = f(di,X, di,X¯). Since f
represents the probability of voting, we expect f to satisfy certain axiomatic assumptions. Recall
that in the spatial voting models, there are two crucial sources of abstention:
i Indifference-based Abstention (IA): the smaller the difference between the distances of
a voter from the candidates is, the less likely it is that she casts a vote.
ii Alienation-based Abstention (AA): the further a voter is located from the candidates,
the less likely it is that she casts a vote.
To illustrate, for the voters in Figure 2, we have:
• Voters v1, v2, v3 prefer L and voters v5 and v6 prefer R.
• Voter v1 has a strong incentive to cast a vote since her cost for L is zero.
• Voter v4 always abstains, since her costs for both the candidates are equal (IA).
• For voters v2 and v3, we have p2≥p3, since d2,L≤d3,L, and d2,R−d2,L≥d3,R−d3,L (IA,AA).
• For voters v5 and v6, we have p5 ≥ p6, since v6 is more alienated (AA).
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v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 v6
Figure 2: A simple election instance.
As mentioned, the models of Downs [8] and Riker and Ordeshook [22] are only capable of ex-
plaining the Indifference-based abstention, since they only consider the absolute difference between
the distances of the candidates to a voter. To resolve this, some recent studies argue that the
relative distance, rather than absolute distance, is relevant.
In this study, we follow the model of Kirchga¨ssner [15] which is based on the relative distances.
The idea behind their model is that, the probability that a voter casts a vote depends on her ability
to distinguish between the candidates. By WeberFechner’s law (see [10]), the ability to distinguish
between the candidates depends on their relative distance to the voter. Formally, the probability
pi that voter vi votes for X is calculated by the following formula:
pi = f(di,X, di,X¯) =
|di,X − di,X¯|
di,X¯ + di,X
. (1)
In this paper, we consider a more general form of Equation (1) as follows:
pi = ζβ(di,X, di,X¯) =
(
|di,X − di,X¯|
di,X¯ + di,X
)β
, (2)
where β is a constant in [0, 1]. Figure 3 shows the behavior of ζβ for different values of β. As is
clear from the figure, for the smaller values of β, voters are more eager to participate. In fact, the
exponent β can be seen as a quantitative measure of how much this ideological distance matters.
For the special case of β=0, voters always participate in the election, regardless of their location.
It can be easily observed that for any 0 ≤ β ≤ 1, function ζβ satisfies all the desired criteria.
Figure 3: ζβ for different values of β.
2.2 The Expected Winner and the Expected Distortion
As discussed, our assumption is that the majority rule determines the winner. However, considering
the stochastic behavior of the voters, the winner is not deterministic, i.e., each candidate has a
probability of winning. Denote by #X, the expected number of voters who vote for X. Furthermore,
denote by PX, the probability that candidate X wins the election. We define the expected winner
of the election as the candidate with the maximum expected number of votes.
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Definition 2.2. For a candidate X ∈ {L,R}, we define the distortion of X, denoted by D(X) as the
ratio cost(X)/cost(O), where O ∈ {L,R} is the optimal candidate.
Note that the distortion value of the optimal candidate is 1. We consider two approaches to
evaluate the distortion of an election E. In the first approach, we define the distortion of E as the
distortion of the expected winner, i.e., D(W), where W ∈ {L,R} is the expected winner. Another
approach, which is more promising, is to define the distortion of E as the expected distortion of
the winner, over all possible outcomes, i.e.,
PL ·D(L) + PR ·D(R). (3)
For convenience, we use D˙(E) to refer to the distortion value of E regarding the former approach
and D¨(E) to refer to the distortion value regarding the latter.
We dedicate two separate sections to analyze the distortion value of elections according to both
approaches. Even though the maximum distortion depends on the value of β, we provide essential
tools to analyze the election for any β ∈ [0, 1].
3 Distortion of the Expected Winner
In this section, we analyze the distortion value of the expected winner. Recall that the expected
winner is the candidate with a higher expected number of votes. There are two reasons why we
consider the distortion value of the expected winner. First, since the number of votes each candidate
receives is concentrated around its expectation, in elections with a large number of voters (relative
to the number of candidates), the expected winner has a very high chance of winning, especially,
when there is a non-negligible difference between the expected number of votes each candidate
receives. Secondly, we use the tight upper-bound on the distortion value of the expected winner to
prove an upper bound on the expected distortion of the election for the other model.
Throughout this section, we assume that the probability that a voter casts a vote is
ζβ =
(
|di,X − di,X¯ |
di,X¯ + di,X
)β
.
Furthermore, we suppose w.l.o.g. that L is the expected winner. Moreover, we assume that the
optimal candidate is R, otherwise the distortion equals 1. We also consider four regions A,B,C and
D as illustrated in Figure 4.
A B C D
L R
0 11
2
Figure 4: Regions A,B,C, and D
In Theorem 3.1 we state the main result of this section.
Theorem 3.1. There exists an election E, such that D˙(E) is maximum, and the voters in E are
located in at most three different locations.
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Here, we only present a sketch of the proof of Theorem 3.1 and leave the details to the Appendix.
The basic idea to prove Theorem 3.1 is as follows: we prove that for every election E, there exists
an election instance E′ with the same expected winner, and D˙(E′) ≥ D˙(E). Also, the voters in E′
are located in at most 3 different locations. To show this, we collect the voters in E by carefully
moving them forward and backward via a sequence of valid displacements, as defined in Definition
3.2.
Definition 3.2. For an election E, define a displacement as the operation of moving a subset of
the voters forward or backward on the line to a new location. A displacement is valid if it does not
alter the expected winner, and furthermore, does not decrease the distortion value of the expected
winner.
In Lemmas 3.3,3.4, and 3.5 we introduce three sorts of valid displacement which help us collect
the voters. Figure 5, illustrates a summary of these displacements.
Lemma 3.3. Moving a voter vi from xi ∈ A to 0 is a valid displacement.
L R
A
L R
CB
vjviv
′
i
v′j
L R
B D
Figure 5: Valid displacements introduced in Lemmas 3.3, 3.4, 3.5.
Lemma 3.4. Consider voters vi and vj located respectively at xi ∈ B and xj ∈ C. Then,
• If di,L ≤ dj,R, moving vi to xi + xj − 1/2 and vj to 1/2 is a valid displacement.
• If di,L > dj,R, moving vi to xi − 1 + xj and vj to 1 is a valid displacement.
Lemma 3.5. Consider voters vi, vj, where xi, xj ∈ B ∪ D and both vi and vj belong to the same
region. Then, moving both the voters to
xi+xj
2 is a valid displacement.
Using these three types of valid displacements, we can establish an election with the maximum
distortion, and the following structure (see Figure 6): the interior of regions A and C contain no
voter. All the voters are located at three points, namely xb, xd and xm, where xb ∈ B, xm = 1/2, and
xd ∈ D. Note that, the maximum distortion value and the location of xb and xd in the worst-case
scenario essentially relies on the value of β in ζβ.
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L R
xb xdxm
Figure 6: For any β ∈ [0, 1], there is an election with the maximum distortion, and the above
structure.
3.1 A Tight Upper Bound on D˙(·)
In this section, we discuss the value of D˙(E), when the probability function is ζβ and 0 ≤ β ≤ 1.
Let us first consider one of the boundary cases: ζ0. For ζ0, the probability that a voter casts a
vote is (
|di,X − di,X¯ |
di,X¯ + di,X
)0
= 1,
independent of her location. Therefore, the same example demonstrated in Section 1 implies that
no upper-bound better than 3 can be obtained for D˙(E), when the participation function is ζ0.
Now, consider ζβ, and let E be the election that maximizes D˙(E). As discussed in the previous
section, we can assume w.l.o.g that the voters in E are located at three points, namely, xb ∈ B, xd ∈
D, and xm = 0.5. Suppose that the ratio qb of the voters are at xb, the ratio qd of the voters are at
xd, and the ratio qm of the voters are at 1/2 (qb + qd + qm = 1). We have
#L = (1− 2xb)β qbn and #R =
(
1
(2xd − 1)β
)
qdn.
Since L is the expected winner, we have
(1− 2xb)βqbn ≥
(
1
(2xd − 1)β
)
qdn.
On the other hand, we have
cost(L) = qbxb + qdxd + qm/2,
cost(R) = qb(1− xb) + qd(xd − 1) + qm/2.
Thus,
D˙(E) =
cost(L)
cost(R)
=
qbxb + qdxd + qm/2
qb(1− xb) + qd(xd − 1) + qm/2
=
qbxb + (1− qb − qm)xd + qm/2
qb(1− xb) + (1− qb − qm)(xd − 1) + qm/2
Therefore, in order to find the maximum distortion, we need to solve the following convex opti-
mization problem:
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max
qbxb + (1− qb − qm)xd + qm2
qb(1− xb) + (1− qb − qm)(xd − 1) + qm2
s.t. (1− 2xb)βqb ≥ 1− qb − qm
(2xd − 1)β ,
0 ≤ qb, qm ≤ 1,
qm + qb ≤ 1,
0 ≤ xb ≤ 1/2,
1 ≤ xd.
(4)
Now consider another boundary case: ζ1. For ζ1 the answer to the above convex program is
(1+
√
2)2
1+2
√
2
' 1.522, which can be obtained by choosing qb = 12+√2 , qm = 0, xb = 0, and xd =
2+
√
2
2 . A
graphical representation of this construction is shown in Figure 7.
L R
10 2+
√
2
2
1
2+
√
2
1+
√
2
2+
√
2
Figure 7: A tight example for β = 1.
In general for 0 < β < 1, the maximum distortion value equals the answer of Convex Program
(4).
In Figure 8, we show the answer of this program for different values of β. As illustrated in
Figure 8, It can be seen that the minimum possible distortion value is ' √2. (for β ' 0.705.)
4 Expected Distortion
Recall that in our second approach, we define the distortion of an election as the expected distortion
of the winner, where the expectation is taken over random behaviors of the voters. Throughout
this section, we assume that the probability that a voter casts a vote is
ζβ =
(
|di,X − di,X¯ |
di,X¯ + di,X
)β
.
Furthermore, we suppose w.l.o.g that candidate R is the optimal candidate. Thus, Equation (3)
can be rewritten as
D¨(E) = PL
cost(L)
cost(R)
+ PR. (5)
In Theorem 4.1, we prove that there is an election with the maximum distortion value and a
simple structure.
Theorem 4.1. There exists an election E, such that D¨(E) is maximum, and the voters in E are
located in at most four different locations.
9
Figure 8: Maximum distortion value for ζβ(0≤β≤1).
The basic idea to prove Theorem 4.1 is similar to that of Theorem 3.1; we collect the voters
using a sequence of valid displacements, albeit with a new definition of valid displacement.
Definition 4.2. A displacement is valid, if it does not decrease D¨(E).
The procedure of proving that a displacement is valid for this case is relatively tougher than
the previous model. The reason is that we do not have a closed-form expression which represents
the winning probability of each candidate. In Lemmas 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 we explain our tools to
discover valid displacements.
Lemma 4.3. For each voter vi ∈ A, there is a point xi ∈ B such that moving vi to xi is a valid
displacement. Furthermore, for each voter vj ∈ C, there is a point yj ∈ D such that moving vj to
yj is a valid displacement.
Lemma 4.4. Let vi and vj be two voters located respectively at xi and xj ∈ B. Furthermore,
suppose that
ε ≤ xi ≤ xj ≤ 1/2− ε,
where ε is a positive constant. Then, at least one of the following displacements is valid:
• Moving both the voters to xi+xj2 .
• Moving vi to xi − ε and vj to xj + ε.
Lemma 4.5. Let vi and vj be two voters located respectively at xi, xj ∈ D. Then, there exists a
point x between xi and xj, such that moving both the voters to x is a valid displacement.
Figure 9, shows a summary of the displacements described in Lemmas 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 is
illustrated. Using these displacements, one can establish an election with the maximum distortion,
and the following structure (see Figure 10): the interior of regions A and C contain no voter. All
the voters are located at four different points, namely xl, xb, xm, and xd, where xl = 0, xb ∈ B,
xm = 1/2, and xd ∈ D. The maximum distortion value and the exact location of xb and xd in the
worst-case scenario essentially relies on the value of β in ζβ.
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L R
ε ε
L R
Figure 9: Valid displacements introduced in Lemmas 4.3, 4.4, 4.5.
R
xb xdxm
L
xl
Figure 10: For any β ∈ [0, 1], there is an election with the maximum distortion and this structure.
4.1 An Almost Tight Bound on D¨(·)
In this section, we discuss the value of D¨(·), when the probability function is ζβ with β ∈ [0, 1]. As
mentioned, to prove our upper and lower bounds in this section, we subsequently use the bounds
obtained in Section 3.1. For brevity, we use D˙∗β to refer to the maximum distortion value of the
expected winner for probability function ζβ.
Similar to Section 3.1, we begin with the boundary case of ζ0. By a similar argument as in
Section 3.1, for ζ0 we have the tight bound of 3 on the value of maximum distortion. For β > 0,
we prove Theorem 4.6 which is the most technical result of the paper. This theorem provides an
asymptotic upper bound on the maximum expected distortion for any ζβ with β ∈ (0, 1].
Theorem 4.6. For any α > 0 and β ∈ (0, 1], the expected distortion value of every election whose
candidates receive at least
9(1 +
√
1 + α)(1 + α)
8(2 + α− 2√1 + α)α
expected number of votes, is at most (1 + 2α)D˙∗β.
For instance, for α = 1/6, Theorem 4.6 states that for every election whose candidates receive
at least 2552 expected number of votes, the distortion value is upper bounded by 4/3D˙∗β which for
β = 1 is 4/3D˙∗1 ' 2. We complement Theorem 4.6 by describing how to construct bad examples
with distortion value near D˙∗.
Example 1. Consider Convex Program 4, with an additional constraint that #L ≥ #R(1 + ε), and
let D˙∗∗ be the answer of this convex program and E∗∗ be its corresponding election instance. By
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Chernoff bound, for large enough value of #L, candidate L almost surely wins the election, i.e.,
lim
#L→∞
D˙(E∗∗) = D(L) = D˙∗∗.
Note that, the bound provided by Theorem 4.6 is almost tight; as the election size grows, the
upper bounds of Theorem 4.6 tends to the distortion value of the Example 1. However, for elections
with a small number of voters, the distortion value might be larger. For example, consider a simple
scenario where there is one voter located at point 1 + ε ∈ D and β = 1 (see Figure 11). For this
case, the distortion value is
PL · cost(L)
cost(R)
+ PR = PL · 1 + ε
ε
+ PR
=
ε
1 + 2ε
· 1 + ε
ε
+
1 + ε
1 + 2ε
=
2 + 2ε
1 + 2ε
,
which tends to 2 as ε→ 0. We conjecture that this example is the worst possible scenario and the
value of D¨(·) is upper bounded by 2 for any election with any size while β = 1.
RL
0 1 1 + ε
Figure 11: An example with maximum expected distortion. D¨(E) tends to 2 as ε tends to 0.
5 General Metric
In this section, we generalize our results for the general metric space. Suppose that the voters and
candidates are located in an arbitrary metric M. By definition, for every voter i and candidates
L,R we have:
• di,L, di,R ≥ 0.
• di,L + di,R ≥ dL,R (triangle inequality).
We suppose without loss of generality that dL,R = 1. For this case, we prove Theorem 5.1, which
extends our results to general metric spaces. Note that Theorem 5.1 considers both D˙(·) and D¨(·).
By this theorem for every 0 ≤ β ≤ 1, the same upper bounds we obtained on the distortion value
for the line metric also works for any arbitrary metric space.
Theorem 5.1. Let DLβ be the maximum distortion value for probability function ζβ and line metric,
and let DMβ be the maximum distortion value for probability function ζβ and arbitrary metric space
M. Then, we have DLβ ≥ DMβ .
Proof of Theorem 5.1. To prove Theorem 5.1, we show that for every election E in an arbitrary
metric space, there exists an election E′ in line metric, such that D˙ (E) ≤ D˙ (E′) and D¨ (E) ≤ D¨ (E′).
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Assume w.l.o.g. that candidate R is the optimal candidate. Let V be the set of voters in election
E. For each voter vi ∈ V, let ci = di,L/di,R. Based on the value of ci, we partition the voters into
two subsets V+ and V−, where
V− = {vi|ci ≤ D (L)}
V+ = {vi|ci > D (L)}.
Now, we construct election E′ as follows: consider a line and two candidates L′,R′ located respec-
tively at 0 and 1. For each voter vi ∈ V−, we consider a voter v′i in E′, located at point x′i = cici+1 .
Since ( |di,L′ − di,R′ |
di,L′ + di,R′
)β
=
( |2x′i − 1|
1
)β
=
∣∣∣∣2 cici + 1 − 1
∣∣∣∣β
=
∣∣∣∣2 di,L/di,Rdi,L/di,R + 1 − 1
∣∣∣∣β
=
∣∣∣∣di,L − di,Rdi,L + di,R
∣∣∣∣β,
both vi and v
′
i participate in their corresponding elections with equal probabilities. Similarly, for
each voter vi ∈ V+, we consider a voter v′i located at point xi = cici−1 . Again, it can be observed
that ( |di,L′ − di,R′ |
di,L′ + di,R′
)β
=
( |di,L − di,R|
di,L + di,R
)β
.
In conclusion, for every i, voters vi and vi cast a vote in their corresponding elections with equal
probabilities. Thus, the expected winners of E′ and E are the same, and we have
PL′ = PL, PR′ = PR. (6)
Now, we prove D (L) ≤ D (L′). For convenience, let
A =
∑
vi∈V−
di,L A
′ =
∑
vi∈V−
di′,L′
B =
∑
vi∈V−
di,R B
′ =
∑
vi∈V−
di′,R′
C =
∑
vi∈V+
di,L C
′ =
∑
vi∈V+
di′,L′
D =
∑
vi∈V+
di,R D
′ =
∑
vi∈V+
di′,R′ .
13
We have D (L) = A+CB+D and D
(
L′
)
= A
′+C′
B′+D′ . Furthermore, we have
A−A′
B −B′ =
∑
i∈V− di,L − cici+1∑
i∈V− di,R − 1ci+1
=
∑
i∈V− di,L + cidi,L − ci∑
i∈V− di,R + cidi,R − 1
=
∑
i∈V− ci (di,L + di,R − 1)∑
i∈V− di,L + di,R − 1
≤ D (L) .
By a similar argument, we can also conclude that
C ′ − C
D′ −D ≥ D (L) .
Note that
D
(
L′
)
=
[A+ C]− [A−A′] + [C ′ − C]
[B +D]− [B −B′] + [D′ −D]
By simple calculation, we have
D (L) ≤ D (L′) . (7)
Since the expected winner is the same in E and E′, Equation (7) immediately implies that
D˙ (E) ≤ D˙ (E′) . Furthermore, considering Equations (3) ,(6), and (7) we have D¨ (E) ≤ D¨ (E′) .
6 Future Directions
In this study, we analyzed the distortion value in a spatial voting model with two candidates, where
the voters were allowed to abstain. The set of results in this paper provides a rather complete
picture of the model. However, the model we developed in this paper is for two candidate elections.
Therefore, it does not consider the possible challenges that frequently arise in multi-candidate
elections. One future direction is to extend this model to include multi-candidate elections.
Another interesting open question is to analyze the expected distortion value of the elections
with a small number of voters. The counter-example in Section 4.1 refutes the existence of an
upper bound better than 2. We believe that this example is the worst possible scenario. However,
no formal proof is provided.
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A Missing Proofs
In the proof of several theorems and lemmas, we use Observation A.1.
Observation A.1. Consider a fraction ab and let c and d be two positive constants, then:
• If ab >
c
d then
a+c
b+d <
a
b and
a−c
b−d >
a
b .
• If ab <
c
d then
a+c
b+d >
a
b and
a−c
b−d <
a
b .
Proof of Theorem 3.3. Initially, vi votes for L with probability
(
1
1−2xi
)β
. After moving vi to 0,
she votes for L with probability 1. Since 1 ≥
(
1
1−2xi
)β
3, if we move vi to 0, the value of #L does
not decrease, and therefore, the expected winner does not change. Furthermore, by this movement,
both cost (L) and cost (R) are decreased by −xin . Let c and c
′ be the contribution to the average
social cost of L and R by voters other than vi, respectively. Before moving vi to 0, we have
D˙ (E) =
c+ −xin
c′ + (1−xi)n
,
and after the movement we have
D˙
(
E′
)
=
c
c′ + 1n
.
=
[c+ −xin ]− [−xi/n]
[c′ + (1−xi)n ]− [−xi/n]
,
where E′ is the election after the transformation. By Observation A.1, we have D˙ (E) ≤ D˙ (E′)
which implies that moving vi to 0 is a valid displacement.
Proof of Theorem 3.4. Initially, vi votes for L with probability (1− 2xi)β, and vj votes for
R with probability (2xj − 1)β. Now, suppose that we move vi to xi + δ and vj to xj − δ (δ can
be negative). Since we assume that these movements do not change the regions where the voters
belong to, after the displacement, vi votes for L with probability (1− 2xi − 2δ)β , and vj votes for
R with probability (2xj − 2δ − 1)β . Let ∆i be the difference between the contribution of vi to #L,
before and after the displacement. Similarly, let ∆j be the difference between the contribution of
vj to #R before and after the movement. We have:
∆i = (1− 2xi − 2δ)β − (1− 2xi)β ,
and
∆j = (2xj − 1− 2δ)β − (2xj − 1)β .
Choose δ as below
δ =
{
1/2− xj 1− 2xi ≥ 2xj − 1,
xj − 1 1− 2xi < 2xj − 1.
(8)
3Note that for region A, we have xi ≤ 0.
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For the case of 1− 2xi ≥ 2xj − 1 we have:
∆i = (2xj − 2xi − 1)β − (1− 2xi)β
∆j = (4xj − 3)β − (2xj − 1)β
And in the case of 1− 2xi < 2xj − 1 we have:
∆i = (2xj − 2xi)β − (1− 2xi)β
By straightforward calculus, we can conclude that choosing δ as below implies ∆i ≥ ∆j :
Finally, since we move two voters in regions B and C equally in the opposite directions, the
distortion values of each candidate remains unchanged.
Proof of Theorem 3.5. We prove Lemma 3.5 for region D. The same argument can be used to
prove Lemma 3.5 for region B. Let ε = |xi − xj |/2. Recall the definition of ∆i and ∆j from the
proof of Lemma 3.4. For this displacement, we have:
∆i =
(
1
2xi + 2ε− 1
)β
−
(
1
2xi − 1
)β
,
and
∆j =
(
1
2xj − 2ε− 1
)β
−
(
1
2xj − 1
)β
.
Thus, we have
∆i + ∆j =
(
1
2xi + 2ε− 1
)β
−
(
1
2xi − 1
)β
+
(
1
2xj − 2ε− 1
)β
−
(
1
2xj − 1
)β
. (9)
Note that since ζβ (x) =
(
1
2x−1
)β
is a decreasing and convex function, we have
d (f)
dx
≤ 0,
and
d2 (f)
dx2
≥ 0.
Since xj > xi, combining Inequality (9) by these two inequalities implies ∆i + ∆j ≤ 0 (see Figure
12).
In addition, since the voters move in the opposite directions and by the same distance hence,
the distortion value of the candidates does not change. Therefore, this modification is a valid
displacement.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. First, we state two simple and natural Corollaries of Lemmas 3.4, and
3.5.
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Figure 12: For every decreasing convex function f , we have f (xi + ε)−f (xi) ≤ f (xj)−f (xj − ε) ≤
0
Corollary A.1 (of Lemma 3.4). We can move each voter in region C to either 1 or 1/2 by a
sequence of valid displacements.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary voter vj ∈ (1/2, 1). Since L is the expected winner, there exists at
least one voter, say vi, in region B. By Lemma 3.4, if di,L ≤ dj,R, we can move vj to 1/2 and if
di,L > dj,R, we can move vj to 1.
Corollary A.2 (of Lemma 3.5). We can collect all the voters of region B to some point x ∈ B with
a sequence of valid displacements. Furthermore, we can collect all the voters of region D to some
point x′ ∈ D with a sequence of valid displacements.
Proof of Theorem A.2. By applying Lemma 3.5 iteratively to the furthest voters in each region,
the maximum distance between voters in each region decreases iteratively. This procedure can be
applied until all the voters gather in one point.
Now, we are ready to prove Theorem 3.1. First, we prove that by Lemma 3.3 and Corollaries
A.1, and A.2, every election E can be reduced to an election E′, such that
• E and E′ have the same expected winner.
• D˙ (E) ≤ D˙ (E′).
• All the agents in E′ are located at three points xb, xd and xm, where xb ∈ B, xd ∈ D, xm = 0.5.
Consider an arbitrary election E. First by Lemma 3.3, we move all the voters in region A to 0.
Next, by on Corollary A.1 we move each voter in region C to one of the points 1/2 or 1. After these
displacements, all the voters belong to one of regions B or D (note that the voters located in the
borderlines belong to both regions). Finally, by Corollary A.2, we collect all the voters in regions
B and D at some points xb ∈ B, xd ∈ D, and xm = 0.5.
Finally, let E∗ be an election with the maximum distortion. Applying the above reduction yields
an election E∗∗ with the maximum distortion, and the desired structure.
Proof of Theorem 4.3. We prove the statement of Lemma 4.3 for regions A and B. The same
argument can be made to prove the lemma for regions C and D. Let xi be the current location of
vi in region A (xi < 0). By definition, vi casts a vote with probability 1/ (1− 2xi) . Now, consider
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the point x = −xi/ (1− 2xi). We claim that an agent at x, votes for L with the same probability
as vi. First, note that since xi < 0,
0 ≤ −xi/ (1− 2xi) ≤ 1/2.
Hence, the preferred candidate of the voter located at x is L. Furthermore, for any agent at x, the
probability of casting a vote is
1− 2x = 1− −2xi
1− 2xi
=
1− 2xi + 2xi
1− 2xi
=
1
1− 2xi .
Hence, by moving vi from xi ∈ A to x′i = −xi1−2xi the probability that vi votes for L remains the
same. Now, let D′ (L) be the distortion of candidate L, after moving vi to x. We have
D′ (L) =
cost (L)− [xi − (−xi/ (1− 2xi)) ]
cost (R)− [ (1− xi)− (−xi) / (1− 2xi) ] .
Note that before the displacement, we had
D (L) =
cost (L)
cost (R)
> 1.
Furthermore, we have
xi − (−xi/ (1− 2xi))
(1− xi)− (−xi) / (1− 2xi) =
2x2i
2x2i − 2xi
< 1.
Hence, using Observation A.1 we conclude that D′ (L) > D (L), which in term implies that moving
vi to x is a valid displacement.
Proof of Theorem 4.4. Let ri be an indicator variable defined in the following way:
ri =
{
1 if vi participates in the election.
0 otherwise
In addition, let Lˆ and Rˆ be two random variables indicating the number of votes L and L receive
respectively. We have
Lˆ =
∑
vi∈A∪B
ri, Rˆ =
∑
vi∈C∪D
ri.
By Equation (3), we have
D¨(E) = P(L)D(L) + P(R)D(R)
= P(Lˆ > Rˆ)D(L)
+ P(Lˆ < Rˆ)D(R)
+ P(Lˆ = Rˆ)(D(L) +D(R))/2.
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Note that for both the displacements, values of D(L) and D(R) remain intact, since we displace
two voters by equal margins in opposite directions. However, they may change the probability
of the occurrences of events ri = 1 and rj = 1. Let r
′
i and r
′
j be the new indicator variables
corresponding to vi and vj , after one of the displacements and let
S = Lˆ− ri − rj ,
Lˆ
′
= S + r′i + r
′
j ,
and
∆ = P(Lˆ ≥ Rˆ)− P(Lˆ′ ≥ L).
We have:
∆ = P(Lˆ ≥ Rˆ)− P(Lˆ′ ≥ Rˆ)
=
∑
a
P(Rˆ = a)
[
P(Lˆ ≥ a)− P(Lˆ′ ≥ a)
]
=
∑
a
P(Rˆ = a)
[∑
b≥a
P(Lˆ = b)−
∑
b≥a
P(Lˆ′ = b)
]
=
∑
a
P(Rˆ = a)
∑
b≥a
2∑
c=0
P(S = b− c)
×
[
P(ri + rj = c)− P(r′i + r′j = c)
]
.
Let
δc = P(ri + rj = c)− P(r′i + r′j = c)
and let δck be the value of δ
c for the k’th type of displacement (i ∈ [2]). By straightforward calculus,
we can show that:
δ01
δ02
=
δ11
δ12
=
δ31
δ32
= − (xi − xj)
2
ε(2xi − 2xj + ε) .
Therefore
∆1
∆2
= − (xi − xj)
2
ε(2xi − 2xj + ε)
≤ 0.
Hence, one of ∆1 or ∆2 is less than or equal to 0, which means its corresponding displacement does
not increase the wining probability of L and therefore does not decrease the value of D¨(E).
Proof of Theorem 4.5. Assume without loss of generality that xi < xi. We show that we can
move both the voters to point
t =
(√
(2xi − 1) (2xj − 1) + 1
)
/2.
Let vˆk be a random variable which is equal to 1, if vk casts a vote and 0 otherwise. In addition,
let
Ak = P (R|vˆi + vˆj = k)
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where 0 ≤ k ≤ 2. Trivially, we have A1 ≤ A2 ≤ A3, and
PR = A0 · P (vi + vˆj = 0)
+A1 · P (vi + vˆj = 1)
+A2 · P (vi + vˆj = 2) . (10)
Furthermore, note that we have
P (vˆi + vˆj = 0) =
(2xi − 2) (2xj − 2)
(2xi − 1) (2xj − 1)
P (vˆi + vˆj = 2) =
1
(2xi − 1) (2xj − 1)
Let vˆ′i and vˆ
′
j indicating whether vi and vj cast a vote or note, after the displacement. We have
P
(
vˆ′i + vˆ
′
j = 0
)
=
(
2t− 2
2t− 1
)2
= 1− 1 +
√
(2xi − 1) (2xj − 1)
(2xi − 1) (2xj − 1)
P
(
vˆ′i + vˆ
′
j = 2
)
=
1
(2t− 1)2 =
1
(2xi − 1) (2xj − 1) .
Thus, we have
P (vˆi + vˆj = 2) = P
(
vˆ′i + vˆ
′
j = 2
)
.
Furthermore, by straightforward calculus, we can conclude that
P (vˆi + vˆj = 0) < P
(
vˆ′i + vˆ
′
j = 0
)
.
P(vˆi + vˆj = 0) =
(2xi − 2)(2xj − 2)
(2xi − 1)(2xj − 1)
P(vˆ′i + vˆ′j = 0) = (
2t− 2
2t− 1)
2 =
(
√
(2xi − 1)(2xj − 1)− 1)2
(2xi − 1)(2xj − 1)
P(vˆi + vˆj = 0) ≤ P(vˆ′i + vˆ′j = 0)
⇒ P (vˆi + vˆj = 0)− P(vˆ′i + vˆ′j = 0) ≤ 0
⇒ 2(
√
(2xi − 1)(2xj − 1)− xi − xj + 1)
(2xi − 1)(2xj − 1) ≤ 0
⇒
√
(2xi − 1)(2xj − 1)− xi − xj + 1 ≤ 0
⇒
√
(2xi − 1)(2xj − 1) ≤ xi + xj − 1
⇒ 4xixj − 2xi − 2xj + 1 ≤ x2i + x2j + 1− 2xi − 2xj + 2xixj
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⇒ 0 ≤ x2i + x2j − 2xixj = (xi − xj)2
Furthermore, since ∑
0≤k≤2
P
(
vˆ′i + vˆ
′
j = k
)
= 1,
we have
P (vˆi + vˆj = 1) > P
(
vˆ′i + vˆ
′
j = 1
)
.
Considering Equation (10), and the fact A0 ≤ A3 we can imply that after this movement, value
of PR decreases and the value of PL increases. Finally, let C and C
′ be the cost of the agents other
than vi and vj for L and R, respectively. By definition, before the displacement, we have
D (L) =
C + [xi + xj ]
C ′ + [xi + xj − 2] .
Moreover, after moving vi and vj to point t, we have:
D′ (L) =
C + [
√
(2xi − 1) (2xj − 1) + 1]
C ′ + [
√
(2xi − 1) (2xj − 1)− 1]
.
Again, by straightforward calculus, it can be easily observed that
xi + xj ≥
√
(2xi − 1) (2xj − 1) + 1.
which implies
D′ (L) ≥ D (L) .
Thus, after this displacement, both D (L) and PL increases, which means that the value of D¨ (E) is
also increases.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. First, note that by Lemma 4.3 we can suppose w.l.o.g that the interior
of regions A and C are empty. Furthermore, by iteratively applying Lemma 4.5 to the farthest pair
of points in D, we can collect all the voters in region D into a single point.
For regions B, we show how to collect the voters using Lemma 4.4. Consider voters vi and vj in
region B. Theorem 4.4 states that we can move vi and vj either toward or away from each other. If
we could move vi and vj toward each other, we can collect them in point (xi + xj) /2. Otherwise,
we move vi and vj away from each other until one of vi or vj collides the boundaries (i.e., points 0
and 1/2).
Now, consider the following procedure: let V be the set of voters located in interval (0, 1/2) (the
interior of region B). While there exists two voters vi and vj in V such that xi < xj , we apply the
above modification on vi and vj . This modification either collects vi and vj at location (xi + xj) /2
or sends one of them to the boundary. One can easily observe that each time we apply the above
procedure, value of
η = |V | · n2 +
∑
vi,vj∈V
|xi − xj |
decreases. To see why, note that each time we collect two voters vi and vj in (xi + xj) /2, the value
of |V | · n2 remains intact while the value of ∑vi,vj∈V |xi − xj | decreases. On the other hand, when
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we send a voter to the boundary, value of |V | · n2 is decreased by n2, but value ∑vi,vj∈V |xi − xj |
might increase. However, since |xi − xj | < 1/2, we have∑
vi,vj∈V
|xi − xj | ≤ n2/2,
and hence, the total value of η is decreased by at least n2/2. Since η ≥ 0, this process eventually
ends. At the time that the process terminates, no two voters in the interior of region B are located
at different locations, i.e., all the voters in the interior of region B are at the same location.
By applying these procedures we can restrict the location of voters to 4 different locations:
xl = 0, xm = 0.5, and two point xb and xd in the interior of regions B and D, respectively.
Finally, let E∗ be an election with the maximum distortion. Applying the above reduction yields
an election E∗∗ with the maximum distortion, and the desired structure.
To prove Theorem 4.6, we first prove Lemmas A.3 and A.4.
Lemma A.3. Let α be a constant, and E be an election instance, with the property that R is the
optimal and the expected winner candidate, and #R
#L ≤ 1 + α. Then
D¨(E) ≤ (1 + 2α)D˙∗.
Proof of Theorem A.3. Our strategy to prove this lemma is as follows: we add a sufficient
number of agents at point 0 to alter the expected winner to L. After this operation, since L is the
expected winner, we know that the expected distortion of L is at most D˙∗. Next, based on the
number of voters we added at point 0, we bound the value of D¨(E).
Let s be the minimum number of voters we need to add at point 0 to convert L to the expected
winner. Since #R ≤ (1 + α)#L, and each voter at point 0 contributes 1 to #L, we have
s ≤ α#L
Let E′ be the election, after adding the agents at point 0. Furthermore, denote by cost′(L) and
cost′(R), the costs of candidates L and R after adding the agents. Since the expected winner of E′
is L, the expected distortion of L is upper bounded by D˙∗:
cost′(L)
cost′(R)
≤ D˙∗. (11)
Moreover, since we add the agents at point 0, their cost for candidate L is zero and hence,
cost′(L) = cost(L). Thus, we have
cost(L)/cost(R)
cost′(L)/cost′(R)
=
cost′(R)
cost(R)
(12)
Now, we show that the ratio cost′(R)/cost(R) is upper bounded by 1+2α. First, let us calculate
the explicit formulas of cost(R) and cost′(R). As discussed before, we can assume w.l.o.g that the
agents in E are located at 4 different points xl, xb, xm and xd. Let pz be the population of the
voters that are located at xz, for z ∈ {l, b,m, d}. We have
cost(R) = pl + pb(1− xb) + pm/2 + pd(xd − 1)
Furthermore, we have
cost′(R) = cost(R) + s,
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where
s ≤ α#L
= α
(
pl + pb(1− 2xb)β
)
.
Thus, we have
cost′(R)
cost(R)
≤ 1 + α
(
pl + pb(1− 2xb)β
)
pl + pb(1− xb) + pm/2 + qd(xd − 1)
≤ 1 + α
(
pl + pb(1− 2xb)β
)
pl + pb(1− xb) ,
and since (1−2x)
β
1−x is upper bounded by 2 we have
cost′(R)
cost(R)
≤ 1 + 2α.
Finally, considering Equations (11) and (12) we have
cost(L)/cost(R)
D˙∗
≤ 1 + 2α.
Regarding Equation (5), we have
D¨(E) ≤ (1 + 2α)D˙∗.
Lemma A.4. Let α be a constant, and E be an election instance, with the property that R is the
optimal and the expected winner candidate, and #R#L > 1 + α. Then, if the number of candidates
would be large enough, we have
D¨(E) ≤ (1 + 2α)D˙∗.
Proof of Theorem A.4. To prove Lemma A.4, we use the fact that the number of votes that a
candidate receives is concentrated around it’s expected value. By definition, we have
D¨(E)= PL
cost(L)
cost(R)
+ (1− PL)
= PL(
cost(L)
cost(R)
− 1) + 1
= PL
( pb(2xb − 1)− pl + pd
pl+pb(1− xb)+ pm2 +pd(xd − 1)
)
+1
≤ PL
( pb(2xb − 1)− pl + pd
pl+pb(1− xb)+pd(xd − 1)
)
+1
≤ PL pd
pl + pb(1− xb) + pd(xd − 1) + 1
≤ PL pd
pl + pb(1− 2xb) + pd(xd − 1) + 1
≤ PL pd(2− xd)
pl + pb(1− 2xb) + 1 (13)
25
Let Lˆ and Rˆ be two randoms variable indicating the number of votes that L and R receive in E,
respectively. Furthermore, let
Tˆ = Lˆ +
1
1 + α
#R− #L.
We have
PL ≤ P[Lˆ ≥ Rˆ]
≤ P(Tˆ ≥ Rˆ)
and
E[Tˆ] =
1
1 + α
E[Rˆ].
Let t = (
√
1 + α)#L. Since t ∈ [#R/(1 + α), #R], we have
P[Tˆ ≥ Rˆ] ≤ P[Tˆ ≥ t] + P[Rˆ ≤ t]. (14)
Now, using Chernoff bound, we provide an upper bound on P(Tˆ ≥ R):
P(Tˆ ≥ Rˆ) ≤ e−
(
√
1+α−1)2#T
2+
√
1+α−1 + e−
(1− 1√
1+α
)2#R
2
≤ e−
1+1+α−2√1+α
2+
√
1+α−1 #T + e−
1+ 11+α− 2√1+α
2
(1+α)#T
≤ 2e−
2+α−2√1+α
1+
√
1+α
#T
= 2e
− 2+α−2
√
1+α
(1+
√
1+α)(1+α)
#R
.
Let
f(α) =
2 + α− 2√1 + α
(1 +
√
1 + α)(1 + α)
.
By Equation (13) we have:
D¨(E) ≤ PL pd(2− xd)
pl + pb(1− 2xb) + 1
≤ P(Tˆ ≥ Rˆ) pd(2− xd)
pl + pb(1− 2xb) + 1
≤ 2
f(α)( pd
(2xd−1)β )
· pd(2− xd)
pl + pb(1− 2xb) + 1.
Furthermore, for any xd ≥ 1 we have
(2− xd)(2xd − 1)β ≤ 9
8
.
Thus, we can conclude that
D¨(E) ≤
9
4
f(α)× #T + 1,
Since
#T ≥ #L ≥ 9
8
(1 +
√
1 + α)(1 + α)
α(2 + α− 2√1 + α)
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we have:
D¨(E) ≤ 9
8
· 1
f(α)
· 1
#T
+ 1
≤ 1 + 2α
≤ (1 + 2α)D˙∗.
Now, we are ready to prove Theorem 4.6.
Proof of Theorem 4.6. Fix any α > 0 and β ∈ [0, 1], and let E be an arbitrary election whose
candidates receive at least
9(1 +
√
1 + α)(1 + α)
8(2 + α− 2√1 + α)α
expected number of votes.
First, we show that if L would be the expected winner, then D¨(E) ≤ D˙∗. Since R is the optimal
candidate 4, we can rewrite Equation (3) as
D¨(E) = PLD(L) + PD(R)
≤ PLD(L) + PD(R)D(L) D(L) ≥ D(R)
≤ D(L)
On the other hand, we know that the distortion of the expected winner is at most D˙∗, which means
D¨(E) ≤ D˙∗.
Thus, we can assume that R is both the optimal and the expected winner. Now, based on the
value of #R/#L, there are two cases: either #R/#L ≤ 1 + α or #R/#L > 1 + α. For the first case, by
Lemma A.3, the value of D¨(E) is upper bounded by (1 + 2α)D˙∗. For the second case, since
#L ≥ 9
8
(1 +
√
1 + α)(1 + α)
α(2 + α− 2√1 + α) ,
by Lemma A.4, the expected distortion is upper bounded by (1 + 2α)D˙∗.
Combining these two cases yields the upper-bound of (1 + 2α)D˙∗ on D¨(E).
4Recall that we assumed in the beginning of Section 4, that R is the optimal candidate.
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